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COMMERCIAL SOUND-ALIKES: AN
ARGUMENT FOR A PERFORMER'S
CAUSE OF ACTION
Commercial advertising is big business,' and music stokes the
engine that powers many modern day commercial advertising cam-
paigns.2 In the highly competitive battle to influence consumer
I See Bloomquist & Stiansen, Forecasters Offer Widely Varying Pictures of Ad Spend-
ing in 1988, ADWEEK, Jan. 11, 1988, at 2. The United States Commerce Department predicts
a 10% gain in advertising spending in the United States during 1988 to reach a projected
total of $120 billion. Id. Robert J. Coen, a director of forecasting at McCann-Erickson, has
projected a worldwide increase of advertising spending of 10.3% to $223.8 billion in 1988.
Id. Goldman Sachs projects a more modest 6.5% to 7.5% growth of United States advertis-
ing spending in 1988. Id. According to the Commerce Department, television and radio ad-
vertising, which are of primary concern in this Note, are expected to account for $26.8 bil-
lion and $8.4 billion, respectively. Id.
2 An estimated 20,000 commercials are produced in the United States per year. Tele-
phone interview, Office of Public Relations, American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) (Mar. 11, 1988). No industry-wide statistics are readily available re-
specting the amount of advertising dollars spent on music, due to the large number of vari-
ables and parties involved in producing commercials, the fractioned system of payments, the
competitive and proprietary nature of the data, and the differing definitions of "music"
involved in the calculus. Id.
From telephone interviews conducted on March 11-13, 1988 [hereinafter Telephone in-
terviews] with a New York television commercial producer, a New York commercial music
producer, and a New York jingle singer, all of whom requested anonymity, the following
estimates were gleaned. Between 50% and 75% of the commercials produced for television
involved the use of music and if the number of advertisements involving musical "tags" or
corporate signatures were included in the total, the percentage of commercials containing
.,music" increases to 75%-90%. Id. Of the commercials containing music other than musical
"tags," approximately 10% involve the use of "stock" or prerecorded music, and 90% in-
volve the actual arrangement, production, and recording of music for the commercial. Id.
Approximately 90% of radio advertisements contain music. Id.
Music for television or radio commercials may be produced either in-house at the larger
advertising firms, or more typically, subcontracted out to "jingle houses," which will provide
an entire package comprising the musical composition, lyrics, performance, and recording. S.
SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, Tins BUSINESS oF Music 270 (4th ed. 1979). In advertising cam-
paigns involving music, typically two-thirds of the ads are put out to bid between the vari-
ous "jingle houses." Telephone interviews, supra. A typical campaign involving music will
generate between five and fifty musical "demos," or competitive adaptations, before a musi-
cal selection is made by the advertising agency. Id. The winning "jingle house" will then
produce a number of versions, typically a thirty second and sixty second "spot." Subse-
quently, these musical "spots" will be aired, if intended for radio, or synchronized with
single or multiple videotape versions of the commercial, if intended for television. Id.
The allocation of advertising expenditures to production costs will vary considerably
with the type of product being advertised, the nature of the commercial, and the purpose of
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spending patterns, advertisers have utilized celebrity endorse-
ments, s licensed commercially popular songs,4 and hired popular
entertainers to sing, perform, or appear in ads5 to promote their
products.
Traditionally, popular musicians have distanced themselves
from commercial advertising campaigns.' But a myriad of factors,
including considerable touring7 and recordings costs, a heavily-
the campaign. Id. An advertisement promoting a new product will usually involve higher
production costs than a "reminder" campaign designed to promote an existing product. Id.
Typically, between 10% and 50% of advertising campaign expenditures will be allotted to
production costs. Id. An average production budget for a television commercial that is
"shot" over two days might allocate $15,000 for music, not including residual payments, and
$140,000 to $150,000 for filming and editing. Id. A musical "demo" may be made for be-
tween $500 and $5000. Id.
' See, e.g., Motavalli, Advertising Blunders of the Rich and Famous, ADWEEK, Jan. 11,
1988, at B.R. 18 (20% of television commercials involve celebrities); Shipley, Publicity
Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 673, 673 (1981) (widespread practice of celebrity endorsements transfers public
figure's goodwill to products and services); [1986] Facts on File-Weekly World News Di-
gest With Index, at 384, col. E2 (PepsiCo announces ad campaign with Michael Jackson,
May 6, 1986).
" See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1970)
(Goodyear licensed "These Boots Are Made For Walkin' "), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906
(1971); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (TWA li-
censed "Up, Up and Away"); see also S. SHEmEL & M. KRAsILovsKY, supra note 2, at 268
(citing three compositions licensed for commercial use). There are several ways in which a
popular song might be licensed for commercial use. For example, the advertiser may choose
to adopt an instrumental version of the composition without substantial change, id., or the
song may be adopted with the lyric altered to present the advertising message. See Davis,
297 F. Supp. at 1146. Finally, the composition may be licensed in its original recorded ver-
sion, without change. See, e.g., DeCurtis, Beatles Sue Over Nike Commercial, ROLLING
STONE, Sept. 10, 1987, at 15 (Nike asserted it properly licensed "Revolution" from Capitol!
EMI Records as well as SBK Songs).
I See, e.g., Buchanan, Radio Kings: Ad Rock, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 10, 1987, at 58
(Jimmy Cliff, America, The Temptations, South Side Johnny, Leon Redbone, and others
involved in various advertising campaigns). Two recent Michelob television ads feature ap-
pearances and performances by Phil Collins and Eric Clapton.
' See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[Bette] Midler did
not do television commercials"); Buchanan, supra note 5, at 58; Telephone interview with
Tom Rush, CBS Records and Night Light Records Recording Artist (Mar. 12, 1988) ("Back
[in the late 1960's and early 1970's], nobody did jingles.").
See Ressner, Touring: The Road to Ruin?, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 17-31, 1987, at 81. A
case in point is David Bowie's "Glass Spider Tour," which was one of the largest shows of
1987. Id. at 82. Despite gross revenues of more than $50 million, the tour, which employed
approximately 150 people and required over forty trucks, was expected to only break even.
Id. Madonna's "Who's That Girl Tour," performed before almost two million spectators on
three continents, was one of the most elaborately staged pop revues to date, at an estimated
cost approaching $500,000 per show. Gilmore, The Madonna Mystique, ROLLING STONE,
Sept. 10, 1987, at 37, 38. Smaller, less well-known musicians have been hit hardest by bur-
geoning costs and the resulting economic squeeze. Ressner, supra, at 81, 82. One of the
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mortgaged system of royalty payments,9 and a high failure rate for
popular music releases 0 create financial hardships for most popu-
largest threats to touring has been the escalating cost of tour insurance, which has risen a
dramatic 1000% to 1500% in the last three years alone. Id. at 82. Corporate tour sponsor-
ship consequently has become an important buffer for a considerable number of popular
performers who have endorsed specific commercial products. See id. (Run-D.M.C. and
Adidas, Graham Nash and Apple Computers, Whitney Houston and Diet Coke, Genesis and
Michelob Beer, Duran Duran and Coke). The Bowie Tour would have lost "multi-multi-
millions" without tour sponsorship from Pepsi, according to Bowie's tour manager. Id. As a
portent of things to come, one prominent tour accountant predicts that "[ifn three years,
every tour will go out with a sponsor." Id.
8 Telephone interviews, supra note 2. Record budgets can vary exponentially, depend-
ing on the number of outside musicians employed, the stature of the artist, the success of
the artist's previous work, the amount of preproduction, and the type of recording and elec-
tronically-synthesized sound production involved. Id. Typically, a record that might cost
$50,000 to produce ten years ago would cost $250,000 today. Id. It is not unusual to see
contracts providing advances to artists of $1,000,000 to $5,000,000. See Arrow, Margolis,
Milom, Phillips & Silfen, Phonorecords, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT IN-
DUSTRY 1987 11 (Practicing Law Institute 1987) [hereinafter Arrow & Margolis]. Major inno-
vations in sound recording and playback technology, such as digital recording and compact
disc players, have stimulated the public appetite for higher quality recordings, leading, in
turn, to higher production costs. See Henke, Daniel Lanois, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 17-31,
1987, at 93, 98 (discussing influence of digital recording and compact discs on state of record
making); Wilkinson, What is DAT, and Why are the Record Companies Trying to Keep it
Away from You?, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 10, 1987, at 69 (discussing digital audiotape and its
impact on recording industry). Additionally, an election by the record company and the
artist to produce an accompanying video will increase production costs by anywhere from
$15,000 to over $500,000. Wells, Music Videos and the 1st Amendment, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11,
1987, at 5, col. 1 (citing S. SHEmwL & M. KRAsmovsKY, THIS BusINEss OF Music 76 (5th ed.
1985)). See generally Arrow & Margolis, supra, at 13 (average recording costs of album are
between $125,000 and $250,000).
9 See Arrow & Margolis, supra note 8, at 13-18. Typically, a new artist will receive a
12% royalty, ostensibly based upon net sales. Id. Net sales are determined after deducting
the number of promotional albums shipped and albums returned. See id. at 14, 23, 69, 75.
But the artist is often compelled to split this royalty with the record's producer, who typi-
cally takes 25% or three "points," and the other band members. See id. at 14, 23. In addi-
tion, many record labels take a $.75 to $1.00 deduction per record for record jacket costs, or
alternatively, pay royalties based on 90% of net sales. See id. at 13, 77.
The largest economic hardship results from the fact that all musical production costs
are ultimately borne by the artist alone. All monies laid out by the record company for costs
incurred in the production of a record are considered advances against artist royalties. See
id. at 82-83. Thus, if an album costs $250,000 to make, and the artist is realizing a $1.00 per
record royalty, the record must sell a quarter of a million copies before the artist begins to
earn any money. A successful artist might typically pay the producer, business manager,
personal manager, and fellow band members with what is left over after the record company
has recovered costs, creating the untenable situation where a record might be required to
sell "gold" (500,000 copies) or "platinum" (1,000,000 copies) before the artist realizes any
substantial financial gain. The record companies have traditionally defended this heavily-
mortgaged royalty scheme by citing the high failure rate of records and the carrying costs of
unrecouped payments. See infra note 10.
"0 See Pond, Gil Friesen, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 17-31, 1987, at 106. One record company
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lar musicians.11 In stark contrast, the netherworld of commercial
advertising often proffers generous bonuses 12 and lucrative residual
president opined that less than one-third of the records released in any given year will be
profitable. Id. During deliberations before the United States House of Representatives inci-
dent to the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America indicated that the failure rate of new records more closely approximates
75% to 80%, and that only 6% of the records released make any real profits. SUBCOMM. ON
COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS
726, 739 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Part of the problem may be
ascribed to protean audience loyalties and capricious audience purchasing habits. See id. at
743; Pond, supra, at 106.
" See S. Werner, An Economic Impact Analysis of a Proposed Change in the Copyright
Law, reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 59, 117 [hereinafter Ruttenberg Re-
port]. Prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, the United States Copyright Office
commissioned a study known as the Ruttenberg Report to analyze the impact of a proposed
performance royalty upon the earnings of popular musicians. Id. at 59; see infra notes 48-54.
The argument against the royalty, which was to be assessed against broadcasters for each
"play" of an artist's performance, was that it would provide an economic windfall for record
companies and performers. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 596 (performance
rights will make rich richer); id. at 633 (performers and record companies are well compen-
sated for efforts). The Ruttenberg Report not only decisively refuted that contention, but
also graphically documented the chasm between the public perception and economic reali-
ties respecting monies earned by popular musicians. See Ruttenberg Report, supra, at 115-
20.
The report found that only about one-half of the musicians had ever made a sound
recording, and that only 23% of this fortunate one-half received royalties from these
records. Id. at 115, 120. For those performers receiving a royalty from record sales, more
than 75% receive less than 5% of their annual earnings from these royalties. Id. at 118.
Almost one-third of the musicians who had made sound recordings had earnings of less than
$7,000 per year, and greater than 50% earned less than $13,000 in 1976. Id. at 120. In gen-
eral, the study depicts considerable economic insecurity among sound recording partici-
pants. See D'Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 29 UCLA L.
REv. 168, 180-81 (1981). House hearings similarly disclosed that a greater number of per-
formers are unemployed, and for longer periods, than the majority of workers in other fields.
Id. at 181 (citing Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978) (testimony of Tichi Wilkerson Miles, publisher of
the Hollywood Reporter)).
1 See, e.g., [1986] Facts On File-Weekly World News Digest With Index, at 384, col.
E2 (PepsiCo announces ad campaign featuring Michael Jackson for estimated $15,000,000);
Motavalli, supra note 3, at B.R. 18 (Michael Jackson, David Bowie, and Tina Turner all
recipients of multi-million dollar endorsement contracts with Pepsi). The fees paid to popu-
lar musicians to participate in advertising campaigns will vary with the stature of the artist,
the use of the artist's name and image in conjunction with his or her performance, and
geographic distribution of the ad. Telephone interviews, supra note 2. One moderately well-
known performer was paid $7,500 for one television spot that was aired only in the metro-
politan New York regional area. Id. An average performance fee for a television ad cam-
paign, without use of the artist's name or likeness is $25,000 to $30,000. Id. One celebrity
performer was recently paid $850,000, however, to sing and arrange two sixty-second televi-
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royalty payments"3 as incentive for those popular musicians ven-
sion spots for a regional campaign. Id. Typically, the fee paid will represent compensation to
the artist for a specified period of time, with arrangements made for additional compensa-
tion should the ads run for longer than the specified time period. Id. As an example, one
nationally-recognized singer received $400,000 for the first four years of a national advertis-
ing campaign, with the contract calling for an additional $100,000 to be paid for each subse-
quent year the ad ran. Id. The fees increase considerably when the performer's name and/or
likeness are utilized in the commercial. Id. The recent nationally-televised beer commercials
featuring Steve Winwood and Eric Clapton were estimated to be worth "millions" to the
respective performers. Id.
11 Telephone interview with Dorothy Doe, Staff Researcher, American Ass'n of Adver-
tising Agencies (Mar. 14, 1988). In 1987, American advertisers paid $340,000,000 in residuals
to the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG") and $60,000,000 in residuals to the American Federa-
tion of Radio & Television Announcers ("AFTRA"). Id. Unlike popular music, where the
performers do not receive a performance royalty each time their performance is aired on
radio or television, see infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text, advertisers pay residuals to
performers for the repeated use of their performances according to schedules set forth in
collective bargaining agreements with the American Federation of Musicians ("AF of M")
(musicians), AFTRA (vocalists on radio commercials), and SAG (vocalists and on-camera
appearances for TV commercials). Telephone interviews, supra note 2. The collective bar-
gaining agreements set forth the initial session fee, which varies depending on the number
of "spots" and performances. See AMERICAN FED'N OF TELEvISION & RADIO ANNOUNCERS,-
1985 AFTRA TEL viSION RECORDED COMMERCIALS CONTRACT 16-17 (1985) (prescribing pay-
ments for doubled performances). Residual payments are then rendered for each airing of
the spot according to a decreasing residual payment schedule that repeats itself every thir-
teen weeks. Id. at 23-24. The schedules reimburse vocalists at a rate that is substantially
greater than that received by musicians. Id.
The current AFTRA contract, for example, provides for an initial range of payments to
vocalists of between $250 for a single solo "spot" or ad and $100 for a single group "spot"
where the singer is one of a group of nine or more vocalists. Id. at 14. The residual payments
provide for use payments of $250 for the first use of the solo spot during the thirteen week
period, $96 for the second use, $76 for the third use, etc., for a class A use for a principal
performer. Id. at 33-34. After thirteen weeks, this schedule repeats itself. See id. at 25, 35.
In contrast, the AF of M contract provides for an initial session fee of $78 per hour for
five or more musicians, with an additional 30% if a musician "doubles" by playing another
instrument on the session. The initial session fee includes the residual payments for the
initial thirteen week period, and the musician is paid 70% of the initial session fee for the
subsequent thirteen weeks. Unlike singers, who are paid per spot produced, the musicians
may be asked to perform on up to three different spots for the same initial session fee. See
MAY 1, 1987-APL 30, 1989 AmERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS, TELEVISION AND RADIO COM-
mRCIAL ANNOUNC EENTs AGREEMENT 12, 20 (updated as of Nov. 4, 1988).
A fairly large, national campaign that runs for one year might generate $15,000 in
residuals for a vocalist, and residual payments exceeding $200,000 are not uncommon. See
Buchanan, supra note 5, at 58. The fee paid to celebrity performers is often an advance
against "double-scale" residuals, i.e., royalties, at twice the specified rates. Telephone inter-
views, supra note 2. The fee thus serves as a guaranteed minimum royalty payment for the
artist, but the artist's ultimate compensation will be substantially higher in a successful
national advertising campaign. Id. While musicians do not receive royalty payments based
upon television and radio airings of their performances, the recording industry has set up a
Special Payments Fund by which musicians receive an annual check representing their
share of monies set aside by the record companies from record sales for their contribution to
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turesome enough to ford the River Styx. The increasingly common
result is an uneasy marriage of convenience, symbiotically wedding
performer to advertiser in a labyrinthine scheme that provides
popular musicians with the large infusions of capital and public-
ity 14 necessary to sustain their careers,15 in exchange for the exclu-
sive right to exploit the performer's accrued "goodwill."' 6
As an alternative, advertisers sometimes elect to produce com-
mercials employing "sound-alikes,"' 17 wherein actors or musicians
are employed to imitate a particular performer's voice", or musical
style."'9 The advertiser may thus realize considerable savings,2 °
the record. Id. Each musician's share, however, is computed on the basis of the number of
recording dates the musician has participated in, irrespective of the success or failure of the
individual records embodying their performances. Id. Thus, a musician who has participated
in five recording dates, one of which was Michael Jackson's Thriller, receives the same "spe-
cial payment" at the end of the year as the musician who participated in five recording
dates involving records that lost money for the record company. Id. As such, the "special
payments" are not a true performance royalty, and represent a contractual arrangement
between the record manufacturers and the AF of M pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement.
14 See supra note 12.
18 See supra note 11; HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 739; see also Statement of the
Recording Industry Ass'n of America (July 27, 1977) ("Only the few very famous stars
achieve notoriety and economic security while the thousands of supporting artists who con-
tribute so much to a recorded performance remain unknown and confront an uncertain fu-
ture." (citation omitted)), reprinted in House REPORT, supra note 10, at 459-92. The state-
ment also noted that at one record company in 1967, only 14% of the artists on their roster
earned enough royalties from record sales to defray expenses, and approximately "188 of [a
total] 1300 performers had a profit in their royalty account." Id. at 473.
10 See Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in A Hurricane," 55 TEMP. L.Q.
977, 977 (1982); Shipley, supra note 3, at 673; Simon, Right of Publicity Reified: Fame as
Business Asset, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 699, 714 (1985); Note, The Right of Publicity as a
Means of Protecting Performers' Style, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 129, 132 (1980).
17 See Kent, Rights of Celebrities, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 6, 1987, at 3, col. 5. For purposes of
this Note, "sound-alikes" shall be defined as commercials employing performers who inten-
tionally imitate a famous performer or performance. One producer indicated that 35% to
40% of the time clients ask him to produce commercials that imitate a particular vocal
performance on a popular record. Telephone interviews, supra note 2. He estimated that
less than 25% of the ads produced involved deliberate vocal imitations. Id.
18 See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257 (1st Cir. 1962) (defendant imi-
tated plaintiff's comedic accent in advertisement); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 86-
2683, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1987) (ad agency hired singer to imitate voice of
recording artist), rev'd, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F.
Supp. 343, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant used imitated voice of television character cre-
ated by plaintiff).
19 See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1970)
(imitation of plaintiff's voice and theatrical style in defendant's advertisement), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937)
(defendant hired actress to imitate plaintiff's singing style in radio advertisements); Davis v.
Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (imitation of plaintiff's musi-
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while still acceding to the "goodwill" that ordinarily attaches in
celebrity/advertiser marriages.2 1 Despite widespread judicial ac-
knowledgement that a performer has a proprietary interest in the
marketable nature of his or her public persona,22 courts have tradi-
tionally turned a deaf ear to claims by performers predicated on
sound-alikes. 23 Judicial relief has been granted for the unauthor-
ized appropriation of a name,2 ' face,25 likeness,26 photograph, 27 and
cal style and arrangement in defendant's radio and television advertisement); see also Shaw
v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 205, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (1975)
(defendant permitted to duplicate Swing-Era arrangements and "sound" of big band leader
on certain compositions); Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620,
622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977) (plaintiff had proprietary interest in his "public
personality" which was combination of his gestures, musical beat, and choice of music).
20 Telephone interviews, supra note 2. Unless otherwise agreed, a jingle singer or musi-
cian will receive only the session fee mandated by the AFTRA, SAG, or AF of M agree-
ments, plus prescribed residuals for his or her performance. Id. The advertiser thereby saves
the substantial fees normally accompanying a celebrity performance. See supra note 12.
21 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (distinctive
voice is protectible property interest); Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259 (sustaining plaintiff's claim for
unfair competition); Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236,
1241 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (summary judgment denied because plaintiffs may demonstrate pro-
tectible interest in "persona" of "The Supremes"); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F.
Supp. 612, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (actor has commercial investment in "drawing power" of
name or face); Lombardo, 58 App. Div. 2d at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (celebrity has legiti-
mate proprietary interest in public personality); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Documenta-
ries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 725, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1964) (voice and style of talking may not be appropriated without author's consent).
23 See, e.g., Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716 (combination of performer's sound, melody, lyrics,
and arrangement unprotected); Gardella, 89 F.2d at 898 (insufficient proof of confusion or
deception in use of sound-alike compels reversal of unfair competition claim); Booth v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (imitation of performer's voice
used in comedy series not entitled to protection under either New York's unfair competition
law or Lanham Act); Shaw, 38 N.Y.2d at 207-08, 341 N.E.2d at 821, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 396
(plaintiff's claim for appropriation of musical arrangement based on performer's right of
publicity dismissed, but plaintiff may be allowed to prove "palming off").
24 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(Elvis Presley's name), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 927 (1982); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 413, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342,
344 (1983) (Clint Eastwood's name); Rosemont Enters. v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 789,
340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Howard Hughes' name), modified, 42 App.
Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't 1973).
25 See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867
(2d Cir.) (defendant invaded plaintiff's exclusive rights to manufacture baseball cards with
faces of leading baseball players), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Allen v. Men's World
Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Woody Allen's face); National Video,
610 F. Supp. at 617 (same).
28 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court extended
protection to a caricature of Muhammad Ali); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122
Misc. 2d 603, 604-06, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257-58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (advertisement
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character,28 and courts have even gone so far as to recognize a lim-
ited cause of action for the unauthorized use and exploitation of a
performer's distinctive vocal or musical style.29 In so doing, the
courts have relied upon a confusing amalgam of copyright,30 trade-
mark,3 1 unfair competition,32 and tort law.33
Musicians have repeatedly attempted to negotiate this legal
minefield by attacking the unauthorized appropriation of musical
styles,34 and in the recent decision of Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 35
involving celebrity look-alike infringed upon plaintiff's publicity rights).
217 See, e.g., Factors Etc., 496 F. Supp. at 1104 (poster of Elvis Presley enjoined); East-
wood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 413, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (photo of Clint Eastwood in National
Enquirer constituted unauthorized commercial exploitation).
See, e.g., Price v. Worldvision Enters., 455 F. Supp. 252, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (pro-
tection for Laurel and Hardy characters), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Chaplin v. Amador, 93
Cal. App. 358, 363, 269 P. 544, 546 (1928) (court granted protection for "Charlie Chaplin"
character).
2'9 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Lahr v. Adell Chem.
Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962); Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App.
Div. 2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977); see also Shipley, supra note 3, at
680 & n.48 (courts have protected style under right of publicity). But see Note, supra note
16, at 138-39 (courts have not extended right of publicity to take cognizance of performer's
"style," including voice).
30 See, e.g., Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (unauthorized use of copyrighted work and "persona" actionable); Lennon
v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 309, 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (common
law copyright prohibits use of distinctive manner of speech for profit without permission).
31 See, e.g., Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (§
43(a) Lanham Act claim upheld); Motown Record, 657 F. Supp. at 1241 (possible § 43(a)
Lanham Act claim exists); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 626-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (§ 43(a) Lanham Act claim upheld).
2 See, e.g., Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1937) (deceptive
imitation could give rise to "passing off" claim); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201,
207, 341 N.E.2d 817, 821, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 395 (1975) (imitations of plaintiff's recordings
present triable issue of unfair competition); Lombardo, 58 App. Div. 2d at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d
at 664 (imitation of plaintiff's public personality deceives public).
" See, e.g., Lahr, 300 F.2d at 258-59 (plaintiff's allegations of defamation preclude dis-
missal of complaint for failure to state cause of action); Lombardo, 58 App. Div. 2d at 622,
396 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (misappropriation of plaintiff's property right in his persona); Onassis
v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1984) (impermissible misappropriation of identity in violation of right of
privacy).
2, See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 86-2683, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
1987), rev'd, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). In Midler, Bette Midler brought a suit challenging
Ford's use of a sound-alike in a commercial following the plaintiff's refusal to perform in it.
Id., slip op. at 4. Midler alleged unfair competition and a violation of her right of publicity
under state common law and section 3344 of the California Civil Code, but did not originally
raise a trademark claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id., slip op. at 5. Midler's
subsequent efforts to amend the complaint to add a Lanham Act claim were denied. Id.
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seemingly scored a significant victory. But when the smoke invaria-
bly clears, the legal vitality of the practice of producing unautho-
rized sound-alikes still remains largely unscathed. 6 This Note will
explore the legal issues surrounding sound-alikes and examine the
possible causes of action available to a performer to protect his or
her unique musical style. It is submitted that the current economic
exigencies of the music industry37 and recent developments in
trademark law38 compel a change in the disparate treatment ac-
corded sound-alikes, 39 and militate in favor of protecting a per-
former's musical style against unauthorized appropriation. It is
further submitted that the foundations of a viable cause of action
exist in New York, and that some form of compulsory license may
best satisfy the divergent needs of advertisers and performers.
THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Any discussion of performer's rights must begin with an exam-
Similarly, a claim was filed by Apple Records during the summer of 1987 against Nike
for use of the Beatles' song "Revolution" in an athletic footwear ad. Complaint at 11-12,
Apple Records, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 17962/87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County July 28, 1987). Nike
has claimed proper licensing of both the underlying composition and the actual recording,
suggesting the ad in issue is not a sound-alike. See DeCurtis, supra note 4, at 15. The plain-
tiffs have alleged, inter alia, a right of publicity violation, a section 43(a) Lanham Act claim,
misappropriation, unfair competition, and violations of New York General Business Law
sections 368(d) (trademark dilution) and 133 (false advertising). Complaint at 14, 16, 18, 19,
21, Apple Records, No. 17962/87; see also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d
711, 714 (9th Cir. 1970) (reliance on unfair competition and "passing off" claims), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 344 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (allegations of unfair competition, Lanham Act violation, and defamation); Lombardo
v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (2d Dep't
1977) (action for breach of contract, invasion of privacy, and appropriation of plaintiff's
persona).
35 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
38 Id. at 463 (limiting holding to specific facts by noting "we need not ... go so far as to
hold every imitation of a voice ... is actionable"); see also infra notes 114-19, 151 and
accompanying text (discussing Midler and its ramifications). As a result, several commenta-
tom have suggested the decision raises more questions than it answers. See Marks, The
Bette Midler Case: Judiciary Finally Listens to Sound-Alike Claim, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1988,
at 1, col. 1; Kent, A New Tune in Using Sound-Alikes, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
'7 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
" Cf. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court
granted injunctive relief against commercial use of celebrity "look-alike"); Onassis v. Chris-
tian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1984) (same); see also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1988) (granting statutory protection against unauthorized trade use of name, portrait, or
picture, but not voice).
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ination of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act" or the "1976
Act").40 Section 102 of the Act41 provides protection to original
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium,4 2 but does not ex-
tend that protection to ideas4" or their intangible expression.44 No
copyright protection inures to a performance or style unless and
until it is fixed in some tangible medium of expression.43 Sound
recordings are expressly included as a protectible work,46 but of the
exclusive rights that ordinarily vest in the owner of a copyright,47
section 114(a) excludes any right of performance for sound record-
ings. 48 This highly controversial section of the 1976 Act49 not only
40 The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
41 Id. § 102.
42 Id. § 102(a).
3 Id. § 102(b).
4" Id.; see also Ausness, supra note 16, at 1016-17 (protection for original works fixed in
tangible medium); Shipley, supra note 3, at 684 (copyright protection not available unless
idea fixed in tangible form).
41 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); see also United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1976) (sound recording protected when final master recording is reproduced in published
copies), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977). See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51-53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5664-66 (discussion
of requirement of fixation in tangible form); Note, Intellectual Property-Performer's
Style-A Quest for Ascertainment, Recognition, and Protection, 52 DEN. L.J. 561, 572
(1975) (discussing pre-1976 Act requirement of tangibility).
40 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982).
'7 See id. § 106. Under section 106, the owner of a copyright has the exclusive right,
subject to limitations imposed by sections 107-118:
(1) [T]o reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of ... musical ... works ... and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of... musical ... works ... and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id.
4 Id. § 114(a).
4' See HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 28-58. Because of the controversy engendered
by the proposed performance right in sound recordings, section 114(d) of the Act was en-
acted as a compromise to give Congress additional time to study the issue. Id. at 1. The
House Report is replete with conflicting testimony as to the value and cost of a right of
performance for sound recordings, with the musicians and record companies lobbying for a
performance right, and broadcasters, jukebox operators, and others whose financial interests
would be adversely affected lobbying against it. See D'Onofrio, supra note 11, at 169. Con-
gress ultimately adopted the broadcaster's position. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1982) (exclusive
rights in sound recording do not include right of performance).
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precludes the artist from controlling the public presentation of his
or her performance in the fixed work,50 but also denies the artist a
royalty for the commercial use of his or her performance. 51 While
composers and publishers receive a performance royalty for each
sale52 and for each "play"53 of the record containing a copyrighted
composition, the artists and musicians whose performances are em-
bodied in the popular rendition do not.5 4 Moreover, section 114(b)
specifically permits imitation of a sound recording, provided it is
accomplished by an "independent fixation of other sounds."5 5 Sec-
tion 114(b) thus raises the issue of whether a sound-alike may ever
constitute an unauthorized appropriation of a performer's proprie-
tary interest,56 especially in light of the preemption provisions con-
"o See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1982).
51 See D'Onofrio, supra note 11, at 168.
01 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 115 modifies the exclusive rights
conferred by section 106 upon the owner of a copyright. Id. In particular, the right to
reproduce the work, prepare a derivative work, and distribute copies of the work for sale are
subject to a compulsory license if the work is a nondramatic musical work. Id. Section 115
permits the copyright owner to control first use and publication of the work, but permits a
user to obtain a compulsory license from the copyright owner for subsequent use of the
work. Id. § 115(a)(1). Upon proper notification to the copyright owner, a license is issued in
return for payment of a statutorily-prescribed royalty. Id. § 115(b), (c).
" See D'Onofrio, supra note 11, at 168.
Id. The artists and musicians who participate in the recording session receive a one-
time recording fee that is set in accordance with the AF of M collective bargaining agree-
ment, but will not participate in "publishing" royalties unless so provided by contract. See
Telephone interviews, supra note 2; see also supra note 13 (musicians may also share in
Special Payment Fund).
55 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982). Section 114(b) provides in pertinent part:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause
(2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the
actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise
altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights.., do not extend to the mak-
ing or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an indepen-
dent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those
in the copyrighted sound recording.
Id. Thus, the owner of a copyright in a sound recording may not bring an action for a
"sound-alike" record, provided the sound-alike was created by independently rerecording
the sounds on the record and not by directly duplicating the work. See H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 5659,
5721. "Mere imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute a copyright infringe-
ment even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate another's performance as
exactly as possible." Id.; accord United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
" See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Imitation of a copyrighted sound record-
ing is expressly permitted, thereby precluding any cause of action for the owner of the copy-
right in the sound recording. Id. The question then arises whether a performer, by rendering
a performance that is now captured in a fixed medium, relinquishes all common law copy-
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tained in section 301 of the Act.5 7
Under section 301, all legal and equitable rights "equivalent"
to those conferred by section 106,58 as contained in fixed works, are
specifically preempted by the Act,5" with two major exceptions.
State statutory and common law remedies respecting
noncopyrightable works,60 and those rights and remedies conferred
by other federal statutes,61 are excepted from preemption. While it
has been held that section 301(a) mandates preemption for claims
of unauthorized appropriation of a musical performance, 2 it is
equally clear that sections 301(a), (b), and (d) permit claims impli-
cating nonequivalent rights,6 unprotected interests,64 and rights
descending from a federal statute.6 5 Thus, a performer seeking pro-
right and proprietary interests in his performance. It appears that the Supreme Court has
answered this question in the negative. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, the Court recognized a state-created right of publicity
which afforded a human cannonball act protection against an unauthorized televised news
broadcast. Id. After recognizing no protection was provided for the performance under com-
mon law or statutory copyright, the Court noted nonetheless a protectible interest in the
performance and granted relief. Id. at 576-79. The Court thus recognized a protectible pro-
prietary interest in a performance independent of copyright, giving rise to a separate cause
of action. See id.; cf. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663, 675 n.22 (7th Cir. 1986) (where performance is fixed under authority of author,
right of publicity is preempted by copyright). See generally Shipley, supra note 3, at 699-
700 (state-based claims by performers and their acts are consistent with allowing states to
protect intellectual property left unprotected by federal law).
It seems clear that until such time as a work, such as a performance, is fixed in a tangi-
ble medium, that work may be protected by state law remedies that are "doctrinally
equivalent to copyright." See id. at 704. It is far less clear whether these rights are sub-
sumed into those of the copyright owner of the sound recording, precluding any possible
cause of action. See Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meanderings in the Area of Performer's
Rights, 9 UCLA L. Rav. 819, 839-40 (1962).
5 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). An exhaustive treatment of the preemption issue is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a detailed analysis, see Ausness, supra note 16, at 1012-25;
Shipley, supra note 3, at 701-37; Note, The Right of Publicity, Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act and Copyright Preemption: Preventing the Unauthorized Commercial Exploitation of
Uncopyrighted Works of Art, 2 CARDOzO ARTS & Etvr. L.J. 265, 269-76 (1983).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); see supra note 47.
Id. § 301(a).
60 Id. § 301(b)(1).
61 Id. § 301(d).
6'2 See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717-18 (9th Cir.
1970) (unfair competition claim preempted), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Motown Rec-
ord Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1238-41 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (1976 Act
preempts state law claims for unfair competition, tortious interference, and right of
publicity).
17 U.S.C. § 301(a), (b)(3) (1982).
Id. § 301(b)(1).
e' Id. § 301(d).
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tection of his musical style or performance must allege an appro-
priate federal statutory claim, or alternatively, a state statutory or
common law claim comprising rights that are not equivalent to
those contained in section 106.6
In order for a state-derived claim to be preempted, it must
involve a right that is equivalent to any of the rights found in sec-
tion 106 and come within the subject matter of copyright as de-
fined in sections 102 and 103.67 In New York, state-derived actions
for unfair competition, infringement of the right of publicity, mis-
appropriation, defamation, and false advertising are scrutinized ac-
cording to the "equivalency" test set forth in Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc.'s If the act of reproduction, performance, or distri-
bution will itself infringe the state-created right, then the state
claim is preempted."" If other elements, however, are necessary for
a state-created cause of action,70 the claim escapes the "shadows of
preemption."'71
Courts utilizing this "equivalency" test have applied it with
extremely disparate results. 2 As a practical matter, the success of
"s See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Section 301(a) states that "all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights ... specified by section
106 ... and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103 ... are governed exclusively by this title." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
However, section 301(a) is qualified by section 301(b), which states: "Nothing in this title
ainuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with
respect to-. . . activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright." Id. § 301(b)(3).
"See 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAm COMPETITION § 10:30 (1980).
's 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). The Factors court adopted the test proposed
by Professor Nimmer to determine whether a right is "equivalent to" copyright. Id. at 1098-
99; see 1 M. NIMMRR & D. NIMmER, NimMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01 [B][1] (1988). Professor
Nimmer maintains that the reference to section 106 and the rights contained therein is by
way of identification, not limitation. Id. See generally Motown Record Corp. v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1238-40 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing preemption and
adopting Nimmer test for equivalency); Ausness, supra note 16, at 1017-18 (preemption if
act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display infringes state right); Shipley,
supra note 3, at 702 (two criteria for preemption concern nature of rights and nature of
works).
11 Factors, 496 F. Supp. at 1099; see 1 M. NimMER & D. NiMmER, supra note 68, §
1.01[B], at 1-10.
" See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71 See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
712 Compare Motown Record, 657 F. Supp. at 1238-41 (claims of unfair competition,
intentional interference with prospective business advantage, misappropriation, and ac-
counting for use of song and image preempted, but claim under Lanham Act not pre-
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a particular state law claim becomes a function of the practi-
tioner's ability to distinguish actionable conduct, the relief sought,
and the individual elements composing the cause of action from
those inherent in a copyright claim.73 The issue is further obfus-
cated by the ambiguous legislative history accompanying section
301 of the Act 4 and the unresolved question of whether this sec-
tion implicitly incorporates the subsisting common law related to
preemption.75 Preemption thus looms large above state-derived
empted) and Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1531-36 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (claim of conversion and misappropriation of jewelry design preempted) with
Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1052, 1063-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (claim
of unfair competition not preempted) and Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1150-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (claim under common law copyright and unfair
competition not preempted).
" See generally Ausness, supra note 16, at 1018 (rendering arguments as to why ac-
tions based upon right of publicity, deception, misrepresentation, or passing off should not
be preempted).
"' See Shipley, supra note 3, at 704-05. The original version of section 301(b) included
an illustrative list of state actions that would not be preempted, including the tort of misap-
propriation, which is substantially similar to and involves many of the same elements as
copyright infringement. See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 67, § 10:30, at 412. A misleading
Justice Department memo, which inaccurately characterized the Supreme Court as unwill-
ing to apply the doctrine of misappropriation to claims falling outside the aegis of the Copy-
right Act, provided the impetus for removal of the list, resulting in the current wording of
section 301(b). Id. When asked, however, whether the current wording would preclude re-
covery in states recognizing the tort of misappropriation, the sponsor of the amendment
removing the list from the bill replied "no." Id.; see Note, supra note 57, at 274. Subse-
quent cases that have commented upon the legislative history of section 301 note that no
adverse inference may be drawn from the elimination of the list. See, e.g., Josiah Wedge-
wood, 601 F. Supp. at 1533.
11 Prior to the 1976 Act, the leading Supreme Court decisions delineating the scope of
the preemption doctrine were Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). In these cases, the Court
acknowledged the conflict between state law protecting intellectual property and the federal
policy permitting copying of whatever the federal patent and copyright statutes leave in the
public domain. See Shipley, supra note 3, at 687. In both instances, the Court reversed
lower court decisions that had extended state law protection under the rubric of unfair
competition to articles that were unprotected under federal law. Id. The broad dicta in
these decisions, which seemingly provided for complete federal preemption in the area of
intellectual property, were subsequently narrowed by the Supreme Court. See Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (upholding California conviction of "record pirate"
under state law that made "pirating" of sound recordings a criminal offense). At the time of
the Goldstein decision, sound recordings were not copyrightable under the Copyright Act of
1909; the Court, however, determined that under the 1909 Act there was no congressional
intent to foreclose state regulation of a category of writings unregulated by Congress, so long
as there was no interference with federal copyright policy. Id. Since state regulation did not
conflict with federal action, "total relinquishment of the States' power to grant copyright
protection cannot be inferred." Id. at 559.
Goldstein was further modified by Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
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causes of action, posing a threshold obstacle to any potential claim
for relief generated by a sound-alike. 6
Federal statutory claims, on the other hand, such as those al-
leged under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act," suffer from no such
infirmity,7 8 provided the performer can satisfy the requisite ele-
ments of a federal claim.79 This factor provides Lanham Act
claims"0 with a tremendous procedural advantage over comparable
state law claims.81 As a result, some of the most promising develop-
ments for a performer's cause of action against sound-alikes are




Right of publicity is a state statutory 3 or common laws4 cause
of action in tort that derives from the right of privacy. 5 The action
(1974), which concluded that preemption of state law could occur where the state law
"'clashes with the objectives of the federal patent [and copyright] laws.'" Id. at 480 (quot-
ing Stiffel, 376 U.S. at 231). The "clash of objectives" test was subsequently codified as the
two part test under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act. See 1 M. NiMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 68, § 1.01[B]; Note, supra note 57, at 274.
71 See Shipley, supra note 3, at 706-09.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1982). Section 301(d) specifically indicates that nothing in
section 301 is meant to annul or limit any rights or remedies conferred by any other federal
statute. Id. Thus, any claim deriving from a federal statute will not be preempted by section
301. Id.
71 See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text
80 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
81 See, e.g., Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (court granted summary judgment motion in favor of defendant on all but plain-
tiff's Lanham Act claim); Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity,
Unfair Competition: The Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 301, 309 (1986) (section 43(a) is the wild card).
82 See, e.g., Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (per-
former's Lanham Act claim upheld); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
83 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 979-80. For discussions concerning the right of public-
ity, see Shipley, supra note 3, passim; Simon, supra note 16, at 699; Note, supra note 16,
passim. As of 1982, seven states had enacted statutes protecting a right of privacy. See
Ausness, supra note 16, at 979-80.
" See Ausness, supra note 16, at 979-80. As of 1982, thirty-six states had judicially
recognized some form of privacy interest. Id. at 979 n.16.
88 See Note, supra note 16, at 130. Prosser defined the right of privacy as comprising
four separate actions for tortious invasion, including appropriation of the plaintiff's name or
likeness. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTs § 817
(5th ed. 1984). The right of publicity has evolved from the criticism that these "privacy"
interests do not adequately serve a performer's economically-based "publicity" interests.
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evolved from the theory of appropriation,86 and is analogous to
copyright law in that it seeks to encourage creativity" by affording
a performer protection for his creative interests.8 Unlike copy-
right, however, a right of publicity extends the scope of protection
to nonfixed, intangible aspects of persona, such as name,89 like-
ness,9 0 characterization, 1 performance, 92 and materials associated
with a personality.93 This extended protection for noncopyright-
able interests creates considerable tension with the limited creative
monopoly that authors possess under the 1976 Act. 4 Conse-
quently, it has been noted that a right of publicity cause of action
more closely resembles a trademark action. 5
Whether the 1976 Act preempts a state-created right is an is-
sue that figures prominently in any right of publicity action. 6 Un-
Note, supra note 16, at 130-31; see also Ausness, supra note 16, at 979, 982 (right of privacy
does not protect economic interests covered by right of publicity).
88 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 979-81; Simon, supra note 16, at 701. The theory of
appropriation differs from that of misappropriation. See Ausness, supra note 16, at 981
n.25. Appropriation refers to the invasion of one's right of privacy, whereas misappropria-
tion is associated with claims involving unfair competition. See id. The appropriation theory
is most often employed by celebrities seeking "to protect themselves from unauthorized ex-
ploitation by others." Id. at 981.
11 See Simon, supra note 16, at 722.
88 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 978; Shipley, supra note 3, at 682; Simon, supra note
16, at 722. Ausness identifies two separate interests at stake for the celebrity: a performance
value, encompassing the economic demand for his performance, and the recognition value,
which comports, to an extent, with business goodwill. Ausness, supra note 16, at 977. These
distinct interests give rise to separate types of publicity claims. Id. at 989-94.
88 See supra note 24.
80 See supra note 26.
9' See supra note 28; see also Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div.
2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (2d Dep't 1977) (legitimate proprietary interest in public
personality).
92 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (human
cannonball act protected from unauthorized appropriation).
93 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). Although Russen
was based, in part, upon unfair competition and trademark infringement claims, the court
indicated that New Jersey would recognize a right of publicity claim based upon the com-
mercial exploitation of a live stage performance. Id. at 1361.
9 See Simon, supra note 16, at 722-23; see also Brown, supra note 81, at 305 (exclusive
rights exceeding copyright boundaries are "troublesome"); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1982)
(Act protects works in tangible medium but no such protection afforded ideas or processes
embodied in such works).
0' See Shipley, supra note 3, at 684 (both right of publicity and trademark causes of
action stem from concept of public recognition).
98 See generally Ausness, supra note 16, at 1012-25 (discussing state-created rights that
are or are not preempted by Act); Shipley, supra note 3, at 676 ("the overriding objectives
of federal copyright policy preempt the right to the extent that the right is defined as
perpetual").
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fortunately, the courts have not always been consistent in deciding
whether copyright laws preempt publicity rights or derivative in-
terests ~ 7 While a strong argument can and has been made for ex-
tending protection to intellectual products otherwise unprotected
by copyright laws,98 and while some courts have suggested that this
evolving state law action is not preempted,99 there is still consider-
able uncertainty as to whether an action based on a right of public-
ity may be preempted.100 One commentator has suggested that a
right of publicity action seeking to protect more than a performer's
name or likeness is more apt to fall within the penumbra of pre-
emption.101 Right of publicity actions seeking to protect a privacy
interest, on the other hand, are less susceptible to preemption than
actions brought to vindicate an economic interest.102 It is submit-
ted, however, that dilution of a performer's "goodwill" through un-
authorized endorsement arguably implicates interests10 3 and ele-
ments104 distinctive of the rights conferred by copyright and
should therefore survive preemption.
A number of jurisdictions, including New York 0 5 and Califor-
nia,' °8 have a statutorily-conferred right of publicity.07 The New
York statute'08 provides protection for "[a]ny person whose name,
portrait or picture is used.., for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade without... written consent."' 0 9 However, since
the statute confers no protection to performers for unauthorized
appropriation of vocal or musical style"10 and preempts the com-
97 Compare Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (no pre-
emption of right of publicity) and Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (no preemption found) with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711
(9th Cir. 1970) (right of publicity preempted), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
98 See Shipley, supra note 3, at 681, 699, 700, 707.
11 See id. at 706.
"0I See id. at 700. See generally Ausness, supra note 16, at 1012-13 (explaining relation-
ship between rights of publicity and preemption).
101 See Shipley, supra note 3, at 707.
202 Id. at 719-20.
103 Id. at 720-21.
104 Id. at 721-22.
101 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989).
101 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering Supp. 1988).
107 See supra note 83.
101 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
109 Id.
110 See Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 621, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (2d Dep't 1977) ("statute is not to be construed so as to generally prohibit
the depiction or representation of the characteristics of the particular complainant").
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mon law right of publicity in New York,'11 such unauthorized ap-
propriation falls outside the scope of the statute's protections." 2
The California statute, on the other hand, specifically extends
protection to any unauthorized use of a "name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness" for commercial purposes."13 Recently, in
Midler, the Ninth Circuit, in construing the scope of California's
statutory right of publicity," 4 declined to extend the term "like-
ness" to include vocal imitations." 5 Instead, the court identified a
common law publicity right" 6 in the "distinctive voice of a profes-
sional singer [who] is widely known, 1 v and held that the appro-
"I See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580,
584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984). In Stephano, the New York Court of Appeals explained
that "[s]ince the 'right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect
of the right of privacy, which ... is exclusively statutory in this State, the plaintiff cannot
claim an independent common-law right of publicity." Id.
12 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989) (only name,
portrait, or picture protected); see also Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir.
1962) (denying relief for vocal imitation under §§ 50 and 51 of New York Civil Rights Law);
Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937) (same).
Recently, a bill has been introduced in the New York State Legislature rendering pub-
licity rights fully transferable and descendible. Ironically, the bill extends protection for the
unauthorized use of a "deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph or like-
ness, in any manner, including... any limitation, simulation or impersonation thereof." See
N.Y.S. 6843, 211th Sess. (1988). Should the bill pass unaltered, it would confer a far more
extensive right of publicity upon deceased celebrities than that currently enjoyed by living
celebrities. It would, however, provide the representatives of deceased performers with a
viable cause of action against the use of commercial sound-alikes. See id.
.. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering Supp. 1988).
" Id. In California, unlike New York, common law protection against an invasion of
privacy by the appropriation of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has been
complemented, not codified, by its statutory analog. Compare Eastwood v. Superior Court,
149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1983) (invasion of privacy by appropria-
tion "has been complemented legislatively") with Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at 183, 474 N.E.2d
at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (1984) (New York right of privacy is exclusively statutory). The
California statute, in fact, explicitly notes that the remedies under this provision are merely
"cumulative." CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(g) (Deering Supp. 1988).
" Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
ni Id. The court looked to California Civil Code section 990, California's companion
statute to section 3344, which protects against the use of a deceased person's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness. Section 990(b) specifically indicates that the rights it
recognizes are "property rights." CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (Deering Supp. 1988). By analogy,
the court found a common law "property right" in the attributes of one's identity by declar-
ing that this property included the "distinctive voice of a [widely known] professional
singer." See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. The court then relied upon Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), a right of publicity action, to find that
appropriation of this "property right" constitutes an actionable tort in California. Midler,
849 F.2d at 463.
"I Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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priation of this right constituted an actionable tort.118 It is submit-
ted that, in light of the court's cursory treatment of the
preemption issue,119 it remains to be seen whether the decision will
prove to be a harbinger of change or a shibboleth of California
18 Id. at 463-64.
'9 See id. at 463. The court briefly addressed the preemption issue in its attempt to
distinguish, rather than overrule, Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir. 1970). See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. The Midler court did not explicitly overrule Sina-
tra, noting that, in contrast to Sinatra, there was no unfair competition claim present. Id.
Nonetheless, the court construed Sinatra to stand for the proposition that a performer
"claiming a secondary meaning" in his or her rendition of a copyrighted composition will be
preempted by federal copyright law because of the potential licensing conflicts that would
arise. Id. The court distinguished Midler's claim as not seeking relief for Ford's use of the
underlying composition, but rather, as seeking damages for the deliberate appropriation of a
personality attribute-her voice-which was not preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act. See
supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussion of preemption under the 1976 Copy-
right Act). The Midler court also noted that "[a] voice is not copyrightable," since the
sounds are not fixed and the statute clearly requires fixation in a tangible medium of ex-
pression. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. It is submitted that this statement was conclusory for the
three following reasons.
First, the court clearly failed to employ the test prescribed by section 301 of the Copy-
right Act for determining whether the cause of action should be preempted. Under this test,
the court was required to determine whether the right created by the court was "equivalent
to" copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1982). Under the Nimmer test for equivalency, as set
forth in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982), the state claim
is preempted if the act of reproduction, performance, or distribution infringes the right. See
supra notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text. It is submitted that this analysis would have
subjected this common law right of publicity to much tougher scrutiny than it received.
Second, the court, in stating that Midler's voice was not "fixed," failed to consider Mid-
ler's prior recorded version of "Do You Wanna Dance," which provided the basis for the
sound-alike. Since Midler's voice had been recorded, the performance was fixed, strengthen-
ing the preemption argument.
Third, the court failed to address the policy concerns underlying the preemption doc-
trine-the federal policy of "allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and
copyright laws leave in the public domain." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
While the court's decision in Midler comported with the factual equities of the case, it
is submitted that the legal underpinnings of the decision would have been on firmer ground
with a more comprehensive analysis of the preemption issue. Additionally, uncertainty in
this area is exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of "victories" for performers to
date have been procedural in nature. See, e.g., Midler, 849 F.2d at 464 (reversing summary
judgment for defendant based on common law right of publicity); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co.,
300 F.2d 256, 258-59, 260 (1st Cir. 1962) (reversing dismissal of complaint for failure to state
cause of action based on possible defamation and unfair competition claims); Motown Rec-
ord Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (denying
summary judgment motion based on potential Lanham Act claim); Shaw v. Time-Life
Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 207-08, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820-21, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 395-96 (1975)
(affirming denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's unfair competi-
tion claim).
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common law with respect to publicity rights.
MISAPPROPRIATION
The tort of misappropriation'" is similar in nature to a claim
based on a right of publicity 2' as well as one based on unfair com-
petition'22 with which it is often confused. 23 In New York, the
cause of action for misappropriation has been expanded to encom-
pass acts of "commercial immorality" 12- and to protect against "a
defendant's competing use of a valuable product or idea created by
the plaintiff through investment of time, effort, money and exper-
tise."'2 5 Nonetheless, the cause of action often falls prey to the pre-
emption doctrine126 because of the "amorphous" nature of the ele-
ments constituting the claim. 21 The tort is predicated on a judicial
recognition of a proprietary interest in a noncopyrightable creative
effort,12 8 and thus is ideally suited to sound-alike claims, although
it has seldom been directly invoked. 29 But in identifying an analo-
120 See generally Simon, supra note 16, at 724-25 (discussing origin of misappropriation
action). The tort was first recognized in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918). The term is to be distinguished from appropriation, which serves as a basis
for the right of publicity. See Ausness, supra note 16, at 981 n.25. The gravamen of a misap-
propriation claim is the appropriation by a competitor of a quasi-proprietary right, often in
a blatant manner. See Simon, supra note 16, at 724.
121 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 986; Shipley, supra note 3, at 684.
122 See Universal City Studios v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1475-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Ausness, supra note 16, at 986; Note, supra note 16, at 156-57.
122 See Universal City Studios, 634 F. Supp. at 1475; Shipley, supra note 3, at 685.
12 See Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir.
1982); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795
(1st Dep't 1951).
2 Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
tort has been described as "amorphous," and characterized as the taking of "the skill, ex-
penditures and labors of a competitor" and "misappropriation for the commercial advantage
of one person.., a benefit or 'property' right belonging to another." Standard & Poor's, 683
F.2d at 710 (citation omitted).
226 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, 634 F. Supp. at 1475 (preemption of plaintiff's
claim of "misappropriation and reproduction of the style and characters of. . . television
series into T-shirt form"); Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535-36 (misappropriation claim pre-
empted by federal law).
227 See Standard & Poor's, 683 F.2d at 710; Simon, supra note 16, at 725.
128 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-38 (1918).
128 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (no misappropria-
tion claim, but claims for unfair competition and appropriation); Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (no misappropriation claim, although claim for
unfair competition), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d
256 (1st Cir. 1962) (claims of invasion of privacy, unfair competition, and defamation); cf.
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gous property right in a creation, a misappropriation claim most
closely parallels those rights conferred by the copyright statute,130
creating a preemption problem that may render misappropriation
an untenable vehicle for relief."31 While a majority of jurisdictions
have determined that misappropriation claims are not preempted
by the 1976 Act,13 2  New York has nonetheless concluded
otherwise.133
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Unfair competition comprises a variety of actions for unfair
and deceptive business practices,3 including misappropriation,3 5
Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (plaintiff's unfair compe-
tition claim based upon misappropriation of her performance-relief denied); Lennon v.
Pulsebeat News, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 309, 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (plaintiffs, The
Beatles, alleged utilization "for profit, without plaintiffs' permission, their distinctive man-
ner of speech and expression" in taped interviews-misappropriation claim recognized).
130 See Universal City Studios v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1476
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Nonetheless, misappropriation might be said to differ from copyright in that there is
an additional element of unfairness and an unjustifiable attempt to profit from another's
labors. See Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1151-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). In Roy
Export, the district court observed that federal copyright law did not preempt an unfair
competition claim, but cited the language of Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950),
aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951), the seminal misappropriation
case in New York. See Roy Export, 503 F. Supp. at 1151-52. The Roy Export court reasoned
that the cause of action required the additional elements of unfairness and an unjustifiable
attempt to profit from another's creation, thereby precluding preemption. Id. at 1152. In the
alternative, the court noted that the creation in issue was not subject to federal copyright
law, but rather, state copyright protection, which clearly did not preempt a state unfair
competition claim. See id. On appeal, the Second Circuit expressly refused to consider the
first rationale, and affirmed on the basis of this second ground. See 672 F.2d at 1099, 1104.
But cf. Universal City Studios, 634 F. Supp. at 1475 (court refused to be constrained by
Roy Export and concluded that commercial immorality or unfairness not sufficient addi-
tional element for preemption purposes). Additionally, this cause of action differs from an
unfair competition claim in that relief is possible in a misappropriation action in the ab-
sence of fraud or deception. See Simon, supra note 16, at 726 (misappropriation action lacks
unfair competition requirement of "passing off"); Note, supra note 45, at 585.
1' See Note, supra note 45, at 586.
132 See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 67, § 10:30.
M See Universal City Studios, 634 F. Supp. at 1475-76; Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535-
36.
134 See Simon, supra note 16, at 727. For a partial listing of some of the various actions
protected against by unfair competition, see Note, supra note 45, at 580, 581 & n.61.
"I' See Universal City Studios v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1474
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Ausness, supra note 16, at 983.
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"passing off," 13  and trademark infringement. 137  The action
evolved as a principle of equity, to provide relief for unscrupulous
business practices resulting in confusion of goods as between pro-
spective purchasers. 38 This cause of action has been the gravamen
of the complaint in each of the leading sound-alike cases to date,
with mixed results. 39 An action for unfair competition tradition-
ally requires a showing of actual competition 140 as well as evidence
that there was some deception or false representation to the pub-
lic,'4 ' either as to the source of goods 142 or as to the plaintiff's en-
dorsement or sponsorship of a product. 43 In the context of a
sound-alike claim, the performer is alleging that the advertiser's
deliberate imitation of a vocal or musical style was meant to inten-
130 See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Ausness, supra note 16, at 983. The tort of "passing off" or
"palming off" consists of making false representations to the public as to the origin of the
goods, with an intent to deceive. See Note, supra note 45, at 581-82. The standard is
"whether the resemblance is so great as to deceive the ordinary consumer acting with the
caution usually exercised in such transactions, so that he may mistake one for the other."
Id. at 582 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 957 (4th ed. 1971)).
A prerequisite for a "palming off" claim is that the plaintiff must establish a trade name or
symbol with which the public identifies his goods. Id. at 581. This may occur by producing
evidence of a registered trademark, or evidence that the plaintiff's mark or symbol has ac-
quired "secondary meaning." Id. at 581, 582.
137 See Note, supra note 45, at 582.
138 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 983.
"I Compare Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (unfair compe-
tition claim denied) and Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 714 (unfair competition claim preempted) and
Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (claim of unfair com-
petition not established and probably preempted) with Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d
256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (plaintiff's unfair competition claim states proper cause of action)
and Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 206, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390,
395 (1975) (plaintiff made out valid unfair competition claim) and Lombardo v. Doyle Dane
& Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664-65 (2d Dep't 1977) (plain-
tiff alleged sufficient facts to sustain claim of unfair competition).
140 See Note, supra note 16, at 157. In the Midler, Sinatra, and Booth decisions, the
absence of actual competition was an important factor in denying the respective perform-
ances protection against vocal imitations. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462-63; Sinatra, 435 F.2d
at 714; Booth, 362 F. Supp. at 346. The Lahr court recognized the facetious nature of the
defendant's argument that there was no direct competition in noting: "True, it was not
defendant's product that was offered in competition, but that of an anonymous imposter
whom the defendant, for its benefit, subsidized. This is a distinction without a difference."
Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259.
1 Note, supra note 16, at 157.
Id.; see also Simon, supra note 16, at 727 (unfair competition protects against pass-
ing off of product or service as plaintiff's, or linking plaintiff to same).
143 See Simon, supra note 16, at 727. See generally Brown, supra note 81, at 305-06
(economic concern that imitator may benefit from investments of others is one factor ex-
plaining "eruption of rights").
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tionally deceive' or is likely to deceive145 the public as to the per-
former's endorsement, participation, or sponsorship of a prod-
uct.14 This deception or misrepresentation would, therefore, result
in economic injury to the performer for the uncompensated appro-
priation of his "goodwill" and injury to the public from the ensu-
ing confusion. 147
The leading case denying an unfair competition claim arising
from a sound-alike commercial is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.14s In Sinatra, a failure to
establish actual competition between the performer and the in-
fringing advertiser was fatal to the performer's claim. 49 The deci-
144 See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1970)
(plaintiff alleged deceptive imitation of singing style, voice, and mannerisms), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 906 (1971).
145 See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (plaintiff complaining
of imitation causing mistake in identity); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 895
(2d Cir. 1937) (trading upon another's reputation actionable, whether such "caused decep-
tion or was likely to do so"); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (plaintiff alleged defendants "were attempting to deceive the public into
thinking that the plaintiff endorsed [the product]").
14I See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712; Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657
F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Note, supra note 16, at 158.
147 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 983; Comment, supra note 56, at 842.
148 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
119 See id. at 714. In Sinatra, the Ninth Circuit upheld the granting of summary judg-
ment against singer Nancy Sinatra and in favor of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,
which had purchased the rights to her song entitled "These Boots Are Made For Walkin'."
Id. at 712, 718. The company had run a series of radio and television advertisements using
the music with revised lyrics, sung by an unidentified woman who deliberately imitated Si-
natra's voice and style. Id. at 712. The televised commercials also featured four women in
high boots and "mod" clothing, the type of outfit in which Sinatra usually performed. Id.
Sinatra claimed unfair competition alleging, in part, that the song and arrangement had
acquired "secondary meaning" and that the imitations of the plaintiff's voice, mannerisms,
and dress were for the purpose of deceiving the public into believing the plaintiff was a
participant in the ads. Id.
The Ninth Circuit, in dismissing the claim, relied upon the statutory codification of an
unfair competition claim contained within California Civil Code section 3369, holding that
there was "no competition" between Sinatra and Goodyear. Id. at 714; see CAL. Civ. CODE §
3369 (Deering 1984). The court also found there was no "passing off" by the defendant of
the plaintiff's products. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 714.
The Sinatra court distinguished Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir.
1962), in which the First Circuit reinstated comedian Bert Lahr's claim for unfair competi-
tion for an imitation of his distinctive vocal style and delivery. Id. The court found a com-
petitive interest when an advertiser hired an imitator who mimicked Lahr's distinctive
voice, vocal sounds, and delivery in an advertisement involving a cartoon duck. Id. at 259.
The court was careful to distinguish between imitation not meant to deceive and imitation
intended to cause a mistake of identity. Id. The court found enough evidence of enhanced
return to the defendant and intent to deceive to warrant a trial on the merits. Id. The court
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sion is at odds with what has been characterized as a liberalizing
trend respecting competition, wherein courts have permitted a
mere showing of indirect competition to satisfy the requisite com-
petition element of the cause of action.150 In addition, the contin-
ued vitality of the decision is somewhat questionable given the re-
cent Midler decision. 151
A more severe stumbling block for sound-alike claims has been
an unwillingness of the courts to readily find a deception or mis-
representation that misleads the public. 52 In so doing, these courts
went on to note that "we might hesitate to say that an ordinary singer whose voice, deliber-
ately or otherwise, sounded sufficiently like another to cause confusion was not free to do
so." Id.
In Sinatra, the Ninth Circuit ignored the issue of Sinatra's lost potential revenues for
the ad, focusing instead on the First Circuit's finding of a "uniqueness" in Lahr's voice,
which had achieved a "secondary meaning." Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716. The court declined to
find any similarly distinctive element in Sinatra's sound. Id.
150 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 983-84; Note, supra note 16, at 158; see also Lahr,
300 F.2d at 259 (while plaintiff not in direct competition with defendant, defendant's use of
"imposter" actionable).
151 See supra note 119 (discussing how Midler distinguished Sinatra). Nonetheless, the
Midler court's characterization of the Sinatra case failed to recognize that Sinatra also al-
leged an intentional imitation of her voice and style to deceive the public as to her partici-
pation in the commercial. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462; Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712. Addition-
ally the couirt noted that "[i]f Midler were claiming a secondary meaning to 'Do You Want
To Dance' or seeking to prevent the defendants from using that song, she would fail like
Sinatra." Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. Thus, it is submitted that the Midler court's attempt to
distinguish the two cases has, in fact, vitiated the Sinatra holding by inaccurately character-
izing the case as one based upon the use of a copyrighted song rather than a vocal imitation.
The Midler court also dismissed the singer's unfair competition claim by noting "we do
not find unfair competition here.... Midler did not do television commercials. The defend-
ants were not in competition with her." Id. at 462-63. But the unfair competition claim in
the Sinatra decision was dismissed in large part because Sinatra and Goodyear were not
competitors. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 714. Sinatra, in fact, had based part of her damages
claim on the fact that she was deprived of the economic benefits of doing the commercial by
the imitator, an indirect competitor. See id. at 713. This allegation was held insufficient to
sustain her claim. Id. Ironically, the Midler court, in rejecting the unfair competition claim
because Midler did not do commercials, opened the door to unfair competition claims by
performers who do earn money from participating in commercials. It is further submitted
that the Midler court has tacitly acknowledged that indirect, rather than direct, competition
is the measure by which an unfair competition claim should be evaluated, thereby further
undermining the Sinatra decision.
152 See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In
Booth, actress Shirley Booth brought an action alleging a deliberate imitation of her voice
with respect to a character she had created. Id. at 344-45. The court declined to find unfair
competition, in large part because the court characterized the defendants' appropriation of
Booth's character as mere imitation, and nothing more, which was permissible. Id. at 345;
see also Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The Davis court
similarly declined to find any elements of unfair competition present. Id. at 1147. Davis
involved a cause of action by The Fifth Dimension singing group claiming an unauthorized
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have denied relief on the grounds that either no sufficient showing
of unfair competition has been made,153 or that the claim impli-
cates rights sufficiently similar to copyright so as to be pre-
empted."" This result is particularly ironic, if not indefensible,1 55
when there is evidence of a deliberate intent to imitate for the sole
purpose of "passing off" the sound-alike as the work of the imi-
tated performer.'56
In an unfair competition claim, the plaintiff must proffer evi-
dence that the defendant's actions are likely to deceive the public
as to the goods in question. 57 Proof of actual deception is not nec-
essary, provided that the plaintiff can establish the "likelihood of
confusion.' 1 58 It is helpful to distinguish "passing off" or "palming
off," 59 in which there is confusion as to the origin of the goods,6 0
from misrepresentation or misappropriation claims, in which there
is confusion as to an individual's sponsorship of the goods.' 8 ' In
the former, the focus is injury to the public; in the latter, injury to
the plaintiff.162 Some statutory trademark remedies such as section
43(a) of the Lanham Act 6 3 and sections 133 and 368-d of New
York's General Business Law,164 may provide relief for performers
whose endorsements have been misappropriated or misrepre-
sented, and are therefore separately discussed.'65
It is also important to note the distinction between mere imi-
imitation of its unique vocal sound by Trans World Airlines in a commercial. Id. The court
found that imitation alone was insufficient and, citing the leading preemption cases, dis-
missed the action. Id. at 1147.
See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462; Booth, 362 F. Supp. at 348; Davis, 297 F. Supp. at 1147.
See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717-18; Midler v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 86-2683, slip. op.
at 6 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1987), rev'd, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Davis, 297 F. Supp. at
1147.
,8' See Shipley, supra note 3, at 694-95; Note, supra note 16, at 158.
"' See, e.g., Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712 (evidence of deliberate intent); Midler, No. CV
86-2683, slip. op. at 8. The district court in Midler characterized the defendants' actions as
"something like the approach of an average thief." Id.
,17 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 983; Note, supra note 45, at 581-82.
158 See Note, supra note 45, at 582; Comment, supra note 56, at 842-43.
'51 See Note, supra note 45, at 581-82; see also supra note 136 (discussing "passing
off").
180 See Note, supra note 45, at 581-82; see also Tiffany & Co. v. L'Argene Prods. Co., 67
Misc. 2d 384, 388, 324 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (use by defendant of
trademark tended to deceive public into believing product was that of plaintiff).
161 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 983; Simon, supra note 16, at 727.
161 See Ausness, supra note 16, at 983.
163 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
16 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 133, 368-d (McKinney 1988, 1984).
1"5 See infra notes 178-238 and accompanying text.
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tation, and fraud or deception for the purpose of analyzing a
sound-alike claim.166 Where there is mere imitation of style, the
public is ordinarily aware that the performance is a duplication or
derivative expression of the original, and principles of "fair use"167
permit the imitation as mimicry or parody.168 Conversely, when
fraud or deception is present, the public "is either intentionally
deceived or there is a likelihood of deception,"169 with a resultant
interference with the performer's business opportunities. 7 0 In this
latter situation, an action serves to protect a business rather than
an artistic interest,17 1 thus precluding application of the "fair use"
doctrine. 1 2 It is submitted that courts deciding sound-alike claims
to date have ignored this fundamental distinction by failing to rec-
ognize that unfair competition claims implicate rights non-
equivalent to copyright, and do involve sufficient competitive in-
terference to warrant relief.
While California courts have summarily dismissed unfair com-
petition claims in sound-alike actions' 7  New York courts have
been somewhat less hostile. 17 4 It should be noted, however, that
I" See Note, supra note 45, at 582.
167 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The "fair use" doctrine derives from copyright law, and
is a recognition of certain limited exceptions to an author's exclusive right to control publi-
cation. See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NImmEsR, supra note 68, § 13.05. In particular, the doctrine of
fair use recognizes that incidental copying, educational copying, criticism, comment, and
news reporting performed without consent are specifically excepted from infringement ac-
tions. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The topic has been the subject of extensive litigation and discussion.
See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.05 (giving history and current statutory
format of doctrine).
1"8 See Note, supra note 45, at 582.
169 Id.
170 See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (plaintiff's potential
market for commercials was reduced).
171 See Simon, supra note 16, at 703-05.
172 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979). In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the court upheld plaintiff's contention that its
cheerleading uniforms had achieved "secondary meaning," constituting a trademark or ser-
vice symbol. Id. at 203-04. The defendants argued that the copyright doctrine of "fair use"
should apply, permitting defendant to create a facsimile of the uniform and use it in a
sexually-explicit film. Id. at 205-06. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, rejected this contention. Id. at 205. The court speculated that it was un-
likely that the fair use doctrine would ever be applicable in a trademark action. Id. at 206;
see also 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 13.05[B] (if defendant's work ad-
versely affects value of any of plaintiff's rights, "fair use" defense inappropriate).
173 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Davis v.
Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
174 See, e.g., Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d
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with the exception of Midler, the leading sound-alike cases were
decided prior to the passage of the 1976 Act, with its requisite pre-
emption analysis,7 5 and prior to the more liberal trends in unfair
competition claims. 17 6 As a result, it is submitted that the denial of
an unfair competition claim in Midler surreptitiously and improp-
erly carried forward the common law preemption doctrine.177 It is
similarly submitted that the leading sound-alike decisions do not
comport with the legal evolution of the concepts of "likelihood of
confusion" and "competition," and have failed to acknowledge that
these concepts represent distinct elements in an unfair competition
claim that implicate nonequivalent rights with respect to copyright
preemption. Unless and until these issues are addressed and ap-
propriate corrections made, the precedent provided by the line of
cases represented by Sinatra will continue to keep sound-alike
claims based upon unfair competition buried within "the shadows
of preemption."
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Trademark infringement actions, particularly actions brought
390 (1975). In Shaw, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion for
summary judgment by a defendant record company which had imitated a "Swing-Era"
bandleader's "sound." Id. at 207, 341 N.E.2d at 821, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 396. The court, while
refusing to recognize a property interest in the Artie Shaw "sound," acknowledged a poten-
tially valid unfair competition claim based on the allegations of consumer confusion regard-
ing defendant's records and those of the plaintiff. Id. at 205-06, 341 N.E.2d at 820, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 394-95. Shaw apparently provides an opportunity for a remedy if a plaintiff-
performer can establish consumer confusion or direct competition with the defendant's
product. See Note, supra note 45, at 158; cf. Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernbach, 58 App.
Div. 2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't 1977). In Lombardo, big band leader Guy
Lombardo sought protection from an advertisement featuring an actor conducting a band at
a New Year's Eve party playing Lombardo's signatory, "Auld Lang Syne." Id. at 622-23, 396
N.Y.S.2d at 665 (Titone & Suozzi, J.J., dissenting). The suit was initiated after negotiations
with Lombardo had fallen through. Id. The court declined to find a right of publicity viola-
tion based on the appropriation of Lombardo's likeness, but indicated that the imitation
was "unfair" and amounted to a "deception of the public" that exploited the performer's
"public personality." Id.
"I See supra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
'7 See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. Although the Midler court did not specifically address
whether a sound-alike claim based upon unfair competition was preempted by the Copy-
right Act of 1976, the court indicated that Midler's right of publicity claim was not pre-
empted, and still declined to find unfair competition. See id. Thus, the court let stand the
suggestion in Sinatra that an unfair competition claim in a sound-alike case would result in
an inevitable "clash with federal law ... if damages or injunctive remedies are available
under state laws." Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717.
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pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,17s are the real "wild
card' 179 for performers seeking to protect against commercial
sound-alikes. Trademark laws satisfy the dual purpose of ex-
tending protection to the user of a mark for the value of the "good-
will" he has created, and protecting the public from confusion or
deception.180 Both the Lanham Act' 8 ' and section 368-d of New
York's General Business Law 8 2 are explicit examples of the codifi-
cation and evolution of the common law of unfair competition.8 3
The federal statutes and their subsequent interpretation by the
courts have created a new "common law" of unfair competition in
the federal courts that is arguably more advantageous to plaintiffs
than the state versions.18 4 The result of these developments is a
cause of action in trademark that can provide celebrities with a
degree of protection. 8 5
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 8 " potentially affords artists
trademark protection from appropriation of their persona, even in
the absence of a registered mark. 8 7 The Lanham Act was designed
178 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services.., a false designation of origin, or any false description or repre-
sentation ... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ...
shall be liable to a civil action by any person who believes that he is or is likely to
be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id.
Id* Brown, supra note 81, at 309.
180 Simon, supra note 16, at 734-35; see Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612,
625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The National Video court notes that the Lanham Act's purpose is
"'the protection of consumers and competitors from a wide variety of misrepresentations of
products and services in commerce.... The section [43(a)] is clearly remedial and should be
broadly construed.'" Id. at 625 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Springboard Int'l
Records, 429 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
182 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
183 See P.F. Cosmetique, S.A. v. Minnetonka, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 662, 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("distinctiveness" required under state anti-dilution statute may be evaluated in
much same way as Lanham Act claim); Shipley, supra note 3, at 721; Simon, supra note 16,
at 727.
184 See Simon, supra note 16, at 727.
188 See id. at 728; see, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (actor sought relief against unauthorized use in ad of look-alike); Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (estate of deceased singer sought relief against
Elvis impersonator).
.8 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982); see supra note 178 (text of § 43(a)).
887 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
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to protect "consumers and competitors from a wide variety of mis-
representations of products and services in commerce," 188 and has
been extended to unfair, competitive practices resulting in actual
or potential deception.189
In a Lanham Act claim under section 43(a), a plaintiff must
establish: (1) a false designation of origin, false description, or mis-
representation (2) with respect to goods or services (3) involved in
interstate commerce. 90 The federal courts have expanded the first
element to encompass claims for the unauthorized use of a name or
photograph in a manner suggesting the plaintiff has endorsed a
product or service in interstate commerce.' 9' Advertisements solic-
iting business for the advertiser have been adjudicated "goods and
services," satisfying the second element. 92 In addition, a commer-
cial advertisement will satisfy the third element if the goods are
involved in interstate commerce. 9 '
In general, the "misrepresentation" branch of section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act has been expanded to permit claims for the unau-
thorized appropriation of a performer's publicity rights in advertis-
ing a product.194 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York has extended Lanham Act protection against
a celebrity look-alike in Allen v. National Video, Inc.9 5 In Na-
tional Video, the court granted actor Woody Allen an injunction' 6
against a print advertisement featuring an Allen look-alike on
grounds that there was a likelihood of public confusion as to Al-
len's endorsement of the product. 97 The issue of Lanham Act re-
lief for the unauthorized use of look-alikes in advertisements was
203 n.3 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff may prevail if establishes common law trademark or service
mark, even in absence of registered mark); National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 625 (Lanham
Act applicable to situations not formally qualifying as trademark infringement).
188 National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 625.
189 See id.
180 See id.
181 See Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 96, 102 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, modified in part, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120
(1983); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
192 See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
192 Id.
184 See, e.g., Cher, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 102 (performer's name and likeness actiona-
ble as false representation under § 43(a)); Note, supra note 57, at 284 (§ 43(a) can redress
injury for false advertisement expressly or impliedly indicating endorsement).
181 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
108 Id. at 632.
197 Id. at 628.
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recently readdressed in Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc."'s with
the same result. In the absence of a registered trademark, relief
has been granted under section 43(a) where an author's creative
result has acquired "secondary meaning," and is thus identifiable
with the plaintiff. 9 In order to obtain injunctive relief under the
Lanham Act the plaintiff need not establish actual confusion by
the public as to the endorsement, but rather, merely that there is a
"likelihood of confusion."200 In addition, utilization of a disclaimer
may not suffice to dispel the false impression created by the unau-
thorized use of a mark.20 1
The Lanham Act thus affords a performer a valid cause of ac-
tion for the unauthorized appropriation of his persona, while pro-
tecting the public against deceptive advertising practices. 20 2 Fur-
108 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203
n.5 (2d Cir. 1979). "Secondary meaning is '[t]he power of a name or other configuration to
symbolize a particular business, product or company.'" Id. (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Ken-
ner Prods. Div., 443 F. Supp. 291, 305 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). The secondary meaning re-
quirement is based on the rationale that there cannot be confusion of origin or damage to
the "trademark user" if the public does not associate the creative product (i.e., voice) with
the particular plaintiff. See generally Note, supra note 57, at 284 (modification by disclo-
sure sufficient to defeat § 43(a) claim where public was not deceived as to endorsement of
product).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). Under section 32 of the Lanham Act, injunctive relief is
appropriate for violation of any right conferred under the other sections of the Act. Id. The
public need not actually believe that the plaintiff-performer actually endorsed the product,
although evidence of actual confusion is probative of the issue. See Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, 604 F.2d at 205. The plaintiff need only establish association resulting in "'a ten-
dency to impugn [plaintiff's services] and injure plaintiff's business reputation.'" Id. (quot-
ing Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).
"Likelihood of confusion" is determined within the Second Circuit in accordance with
six factors suggested in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961), and enunciated in Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Com-
modity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982). The factors include: "(1) the
strength of the plaintiff's marks and name; (2) the similarity of plaintiff's and defendant's
marks; (3) the proximity of plaintiff's and defendant's products; (4) evidence of actual con-
fusion as to source or sponsorship; (5) sophistication of the defendant's audience; and (6)
defendant's good or bad faith." National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 627. See generally 1A R.
CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 5.04 (4th ed.
1981) (for injunctive relief, mere likelihood of deception will suffice; in action for damages,
actual injury must be shown).
201 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 832 F.2d 1311, 1317 (2d
Cir. 1987); National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 629; Note, supra note 57, at 284-85; Comment,
Injunctive Relief for Trademark Infringement-The Second Circuit Misses the Mark:
Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 286, 290, 298
(1988).
202 See National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 625-26. While it must be noted that application
of the Lanham Act is limited to those situations with economic interests analogous to those
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thermore, it has been suggested that a plaintiff suing under the
Lanham Act has an advantage in that the element of actual com-
petition need not be established, unlike a traditional unfair compe-
tition claim.203 Another benefit vests by virtue of the fact that Lan-
ham Act actions are expressly excepted from the copyright
preemption doctrine.2°0 It remains to be seen, however, whether a
Lanham Act claim to protect a performer's musical style that im-
plicates rights similar to copyright will withstand preemption argu-
ments.20 5 It is important to note that in a trademark claim, "the
plaintiff does not assert exclusive rights to the sale of a product
but merely to a mark indicating its origin or sponsorship. ' '20 Simi-
larly, in a Lanham Act claim, the essence of the grievance is not
just imitation, but a "passing off" by the defendant.0 "
The only New York case to have addressed application of the
Lanham Act to a sound-alike claim is Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co.20 " In Booth, the court denied a Lanham Act claim based on an
advertisement containing a vocal sound-alike of the plaintiff, ac-
tress Shirley Booth.20 9 In denying the claim, the court stated there
was no indication the plaintiff's voice had been used in conjunction
with any "goods or services"; that her voice alone could not serve
protected by trademark laws, the National Video court noted that:
A celebrity has a similar commercial investment in the "drawing power" of
his or her name and face in endorsing products and in marketing a career. The
celebrity's investment depends upon the good will of the public, and infringement
of the celebrity's rights also implicates the public's interest in being free from
deception when it relies on a public figure's endorsement in an advertisement.
Id.
203 See Simon, supra note 16, at 729-31.
214 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1982). After setting forth the preemption doctrine in section
301(a), the Copyright Act of 1976 then goes on to create express exceptions from preemp-
tion. Id. Section 301(d) states: "Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under any other Federal statute." Id.
2o' See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204 (2d Cir. 1979). The defendant in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders had raised a preemption
defense to the plaintiff's trademark action. See id. (discussing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stif-
fel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)).
The court did not cite section 301(d), but noted that preemption did not apply in a trade-
mark action, where the gravamen of the claim is not the exclusive right to the sale of a
product, but to a mark indicating origin or sponsorship. Id. A question thus remains as to
whether a sound-alike claim brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which impli-
cates rights more closely related to copyright, might be preempted.
2" Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204.
207 See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
211 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
209 See id. at 348-49.
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as a trademark; and that the plaintiff-actress and defendant-manu-
facturer were not in competition.21 0 Subsequent Lanham Act deci-
sions have vitiated both the "goods or services" '211 and the "compe-
tition" requirements212 leaving the argument that a voice alone
may not serve as a trademark. It is submitted that the same ra-
tionale invoked by the National Video court to extend protection
in look-alike actions is apposite to sound-alike claims, namely pro-
tecting the artist's "goodwill" investment in his or her persona21
and the public's right to be free from deception. 214 It is further
submitted that affording protection to an actor for the "goodwill"
interest in his face while denying a musician similar protection for
his voice or musical styling is inequitable. Likelihood of confusion
should be the dispositive issue, not choice of artistic medium.
Two California decisions have addressed the application of the
Lanham Act to sound-alike claims, with opposite results. 21 5 In
Midler, the district court cursorily addressed a potential Lanham
Act claim in dicta, indicating only that it was "quite unlikely that
the . .. Act . . . would offer the plaintiff any aid at all.216 In
Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 217 the United
States District Court for the Central District of California held
that the plaintiff had stated a claim sufficient to defeat a motion
for judgment on the pleadings against the plaintiff's Lanham Act
claim, which had alleged a protectible interest in the persona of
"The Supremes. ' '218 In so doing, the court opened the door for the
210 Id. at 349.
211 See National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 627 n.9; see also Matsushita Elec. Corp. v.
Solar Sound Sys., 381 F. Supp. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (solicitation of sales is "commerce"
within proscription of § 43(a)).
212 See Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see
also Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (false represen-
tation violative of § 43(a) even in absence of direct competition).
223 See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
214 Id.
211 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 86-2683, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1987)
(dicta), rev'd on other grounds, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Motown Record Corp. v.
George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
220 Transcript at 10, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 86-2683 (C.D. Cal. July 13,
1987) (hearing on motion for summary judgment) (Fernandez, J.), incorporated in final
judgment, No. CV 86-2683, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1987), reu'd on other grounds,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). On May 18, 1987, the District Court denied as untimely plain-
tiffs motion for leave to amend to allege a section 43(a) claim. No. CV 86-2683, slip op. at 5
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1987). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not address the issue. See Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
217 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
210 Id. at 1241.
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plaintiff to establish a valid Lanham Act claim for a sound-alike.219
It is thus submitted that any bar to the application of the Lanham
Act in sound-alike claims which is predicated on New York or Cal-
ifornia case law is legally untenable. It is further suggested that
Lanham Act decisions extending the scope of protection to a celeb-
rity's face or likeness provide strong, analogous arguments for the
extension of protection to a voice or musical style.
New York General Business Law Sections 368-d and 133
New York's state law analog to section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act is contained in sections 368-d and 133 of the New York Gen-
eral Business Law. 20 Section 368-d is an anti-dilution statute
aimed at protecting the distinctiveness of a particular mark. 21
Like section 43(a), section 368-d is applicable in the case of a mis-
leading endorsement or sponsorship of a product.222 Unlike section
43(a), however, the plaintiff must establish the distinctiveness of
the particular mark by demonstrating that the mark is unique.2 23 A
mere showing of the likelihood of public confusion is not enough to
maintain a section 368-d action. 24 Upon the demonstration of dis-
tinctiveness, the plaintiff must next establish the likelihood of di-
lution.225 Thus, while the Men's World Outlet court upheld actor
Woody Allen's section 43(a) claim upon finding a likelihood of con-
fusion,226 the court rejected Allen's section 368-d claim, citing both
his failure to establish that his likeness was distinctive or had ac-
quired secondary meaning, and his failure to establish that there
was a likelihood of dilution.227 A performer presenting a sound-
229 Id.
220 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 133, 368-d (McKinney 1988, 1984).
2"I See Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see also O'Henry's Film Works, Inc. v. Nabisco, Inc., 112 App. Div. 2d 825, 825, 492
N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (1st Dep't 1985) (complaint alleging distinctive musical signature and
dilution of its distinctive quality sufficient as matter of law).
22 See, e.g., Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 360-65 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (action exists irrespective of whether mark was used for endorsements or directly
appropriated).
223 See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983); see also
Little India Stores, Inc. v. Singh, 101 App. Div. 2d 727, 728, 475 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (1st Dep't
1984) (to warrant protection under § 368-d, plaintiff's mark must have distinctive quality or
have acquired secondary meaning capable of dilution).
2 See infra note 227.
2215 See Sally Gee, 699 F.2d at 625.
226 See Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 370.
227 See id. at 365-67. The court disagreed with Allen's contention that his face had
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alike claim utilizing section 368-d, therefore, has a much higher ev-
identiary burden of proof.228 Where, however, the performer has a
distinctive "musical signature" and a commercial sound-alike
would likely result in a dilution of that mark, relief under section
368-d might be appropriate.229
Section 133 of the New York General Business Law protects
against the intentional deception of the public by the use of a
"name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation thereof'
to deceive as to the identity of the plaintiff or the connection of
the plaintiff to the defendant's company.1 0 Section 133 is derived
from the penal law2 1 and requires the element of scienter.23 2 Thus,
the plaintiff must establish both the likelihood that the public
would be misled by the improper use,233 as well as an intent to
deceive the public.34 Violation of section 133 is a misdemeanor.235
Injunctive relief may be granted in the absence of actual confu-
sion.23 6 Certain elements in the action, such as intent, must be es-
acquired secondary meaning by virtue of his work, and similarly disagreed with his argu-
ment that his face could qualify for protection, either because of its distinctive quality, or
because it had acquired secondary meaning capable of dilution. Id. at 366. The court indi-
cated that likelihood of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or of dilution of its
"secondary meaning" would warrant injunctive relief even in the absence of competition
between the parties, or in the absence of confusion as to the source of the goods or services.
Id. at 365 n.8. However, the court found that Allen had failed to adduce evidence that his
likeness had acquired secondary meaning. Id. at 366. Similarly, the court found that Allen
had not made a sufficient showing of likelihood of dilution, which would have required a
showing that the similarity between his likeness and that of the look-alike was likely to
"blur" his "product identification." Id. at 367 n.13.
228 See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
229 See O'Henry's Film Works, Inc. v. Nabisco, Inc., 112 App. Div. 2d 825, 825-26, 492
N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (1st Dep't 1985).
23o N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 133 (McKinney 1988). The statute provides in part:
No person ... shall, with intent to deceive or mislead the public ... use as...
a corporate, assumed or trade name, for advertising purposes.., any name, desig-
nation or style, or any symbol or simulation thereof ... which may deceive or
mislead the public as to the identity of such person... or as to the connection of
such person ... with any other person, firm or corporation ....
Id.
231 Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 228, 230, 188
N.Y.S.2d 132, 135 (3d Dep't 1959); see Continental Corrugated Container Corp. v. Continen-
tal Group, 462 F. Supp. 200, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
232 See Continental Corrugated, 462 F. Supp. at 206.
133 See Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. Fairview Broadcasters, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 1064,
1066, 225 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1962).
23, See Continental Corrugated, 462 F. Supp. at 206.
235 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 133 (McKinney 1988).
236 See Varsity House, Inc. v. Varsity House, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1386, 1388 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). The statute specifically permits injunctive relief whenever there is actual or
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tablished by clear and convincing evidence.23 As a practical mat-
ter, relief will only be forthcoming under section 133 in the
situation where the defendant's actions unequivocally indicate an
intent to deceive, thus rendering the cause of action less accessible
to many sound-alike plaintiffs.2 8
Nonetheless, it is suggested that sections 133 and 368-d do at
least provide a theoretically viable cause of action for the per-
former who can establish a sufficiently distinct style which is likely
to result in consumer confusion, and in the case of section 133,
which has been misappropriated with the deliberate intent to
deceive.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The advertising and popular music industries are inextricably
interwoven to the point where few artists can afford to pursue their
careers in popular music without some form of commercial subsidi-
zation. To date, the judicial system has declined to extend protec-
tion to performers against the use of commercial sound-alikes by
advertisers with the recent exception of Midler. Irrespective of the
adequacy of the legal reasoning underpinning the Midler decision,
the change in policy considerations that shaped earlier adjudica-
tions of the issue and the evolving economic exigencies of today's
music industry compel a reevaluation. It is submitted that changes
in the preemption doctrine, as well as judicial expansion in the ar-
eas of trademark law and unfair competition, render the reasoning
contained in many of these earlier cases suspect.
For the performer, the issue of sound-alikes comprises two dis-
tinct elements-control and compensation." 9 At present, the per-
former is afforded neither. One of the proffered explanations is
that policing sound-alike claims would be difficult.240 It is submit-
ted that a court, in recognizing a claim against sound-alikes, would
face no greater a challenge than it already accepts in resolving
threatened violation of the statute. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 133 (McKinney 1988).
237 See Kleinhans Co. v. Kleinhans' Cleaners, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 1077, 1079, 162 N.Y.S.2d
250, 252 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1957).
238 See supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
2'1 See generally Note, supra note 16, at 132-33 (unauthorized use violates right to
control and to profit from performance); Comment, supra note 56, at 819-20 (performers
should be able to capitalize on commercial value; contract delineates performer's control).
240 See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1970)
(difficulties in policing performance create nearly impossible court supervisory problems),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
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questions of copyright infringement or trademark appropriation.
To deny an entire class of plaintiffs relief on the basis that the
boundaries of the action may not be pellucid seems disingenuous.
In recognition of the tremendous volume of commercial music
produced and utilized, and the need for the advertising industry to
proceed unencumbered by litigation or judicial restraints, it is sub-
mitted that some form of compulsory license, wherein the per-
former would be compensated for the unauthorized use of his voice
or musical style, might provide a suitable statutory compromise for
both performers and advertisers. An advertiser could, in lieu of ob-
taining an artist's endorsement or sponsorship, pay a predeter-
mined fee for the right to imitate the artist's distinctive vocal or
musical style. After payment of the fee, a compulsory authorization
would issue, wherein the commercial sound-alike would be permit-
ted to air for a certain duration over a predetermined geographical
area. While artists would still be relinquishing control over their
publicity rights, they would at least receive some form of compen-
sation for the appropriation of their "goodwill" by an advertiser.
The advertiser would, in turn, be paying something for the until-
recently unfettered right to capitalize on the performer's "good-
will." In the event of a contested advertisement where no license
was sought or received, relief could be granted by the courts upon
a determination that there is a "likelihood of confusion" as to the
performer's endorsement of the product or sponsorship of the com-
mercial. Interestingly, this compulsory license scheme would have
been of no assistance in a situation similar to Midler where, it is
submitted, control, not compensation, was at issue.
Performers work many years to develop a "sound" or a
"style," often at tremendous personal expense and financial peril.
A performer's ability to develop his or her unique sound is often a
predicate to a successful recording career. A successful performer's
musical signature or style is often as unique and recognizable as a
face, a name, or a character, all of which are today afforded some
degree of protection. It is submitted that the Midler decision rep-
resents a step in the right direction since it recognized a pro-
tectible interest in a performer's distinctive musical style. Addi-
tional protections, however, should be afforded performers, lest a
vital economic lifeline to the musical community be jeopardized.
To most, a world without music would be unthinkable, but until
performers are able to fully enjoy the commercial fruit of their mu-
[Vol. 62:667
19881 COMMERCIAL SOUND-ALIKES 703
sical labors, a world without musicians remains a very distinct
possibility.
Joseph P. Salvo
